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Public Workers
Various associations of federal, state, 
and local government workers 
formed along occupational (post-
al, sanitation, and clerical workers; 
teachers, police, and firefighters) 
and departmental lines, or accord-
ing to civil service status. An early, 
important goal of many employee 
associations was enforcement of 
civil service rules, a goal shared by 
government-reform groups to end 
political patronage-based deci-
sion-making.
Organizational strength varied. 
Interunion rivalries and factional dis-
putes, as well as political and strate-
gic differences, permeate much  
of the city’s public-sector labor his-
tory. Among the most unified have 
been occupation-specific organiza-
tions. Over time, the racial, ethnic, 
and gender composition of the city 
workforce has substantially changed 
as well, with the uniformed services 
requiring litigation to compel a diverse 
and integrated workforce. 
One thing has not changed: the 
persistent stereotype of government 
workers as a privileged class with 
job security, pensions, and alleged 
immunity from hard work. The ste-
reotype is more than a century old. 
It was used in a May 1911 speech by 
President William Howard Taft to 
justify placing conditions on public 
workers “that should not be and 
ought not be imposed upon those 
who serve private employers.”  
It remains a rhetorical tool used to 
create divisions between public- 
and private-sector workers, and 
to attack collective bargaining, job 
security protections, and pensions.
 Some early New York public 
employee organizations affiliated 
with the labor movement, which had 
long sought to make government a 
“model employer” as a means of per-
suading private employers to follow 
suit, particularly in efforts to win the 
eight-hour workday.
In the late 19th century postal 
and sanitation workers joined the 
Knights of Labor. Later the Amer-
ican Federation of Labor (AFL) char-
tered public-sector organizations 
and advocated for laws to improve 
working conditions in government, 
even when it eschewed legislative 
solutions for industrial workers. The 
Public workers began self-organ- izing in New York City in the late 19th and early 20th cen-
turies, coinciding with an increase in 
governmental services and the ad-
vent of civil service reform.
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New York City Teachers Union affili-
ated with the AFL in 1916. Two years 
later, the Uniform Fireman’s Asso-
ciation (UFA) joined as well. Other 
employee organizations remained 
nonaligned, priding themselves on 
being protective associations of civil 
servants, rather than defining them-
selves as unions bent on collective 
bargaining. Resistance to unioniza-
tion came from another employee 
group—those holding white-collar 
government jobs who viewed union-
ization as undermining their pro-
fessional status. And some had no 
choice: the Patrolmen’s Benevolent 
Association was prohibited by mu-
nicipal law from affiliating with the 
labor movement, even after the AFL 
had lifted its two-decade ban on 
chartering police unions. (The lifting 
of the ban led to Boston’s dramatic 
1919 police strike after officers were 
fired because their union accepted 
an AFL charter.)
Traditional Means of 
Collective Advocacy: 
Lobbying and Political Action
The fact that they worked for the government caused public-sector workers to rely 
on strategies and tactics different 
from their private-sector counter-
parts. State power necessitates 
public-sector unions to develop and 
maintain good working relationships 
with public officials. The government 
has the power to grant or deny labor 
rights to its workers and to create 
and enforce laws concerning public 
employment. A prime example of 
the exercise of that power is the ex-
clusion of government workers from 
the right to unionize and engage in 
collective bargaining guaranteed  
by the 1935 National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA), the 1937 New York 
State Labor Relations Act, and the 
1938 New York State Constitution.
Without collective bargaining, 
public employee organizations lob-
bied and engaged in political action 
Strikebreakers 
“Breaking Garbage 
Strike at $5 a day,” 
1911
to improve working conditions. Most 
public-worker organizations limit-
ed their focus to bread-and-butter 
issues: wages, hours, pensions, and 
job security. The latter was what 
attracted many workers, including 
African Americans, women, and 
ethnic minorities, to public service. 
Early legislative victories brought 
elements of industrial democracy to 
New York’s public sector by giving 
employees a voice in the workplace 
through due process disciplinary 
procedures, a salary classification 
system, equal pay for women teach-
ers, and platoon systems for fire-
fighters and police. 
A prominent practitioner of 
maintaining close working rela-
tionships with elected officials, 
party leaders, and candidates was 
an organization of workers in city 
departments known as the Civil 
Service Forum, long led by onetime 
Deputy Comptroller Frank J. Prial 
who owned the civil service news-
paper, The Chief. The Civil Service 
Forum closely aligned itself with 
politicians and it opposed collec-
tive bargaining and strikes. The 
organization’s close collaboration 
and entanglement with partisan 
political forces undermined its or-
ganizational independence.
The effectiveness of lobby-
ing and informal negotiations was 
limited. Public officials had no legal 
obligation to meet or confer with 
subordinates or their representa-
tives. The civil liberties of govern-
ment workers were suppressed, 
and workers were retaliated against, 
based on political or union activities. 
Presidential gag orders had prohib-
ited federal workers from lobby-
ing Congress concerning working 
conditions. The New York City 
Charter once banned police officers, 
firefighters, and teachers from joining 
or supporting organizations that 
lobbied, and teachers were subject to 
loyalty oaths. 
During the first half of the 20th 
century, legislation made gradual in-
roads. The federal Lloyd-La Follette 
Act of 1912 was the first important 
law to protect the civil liberties of 
public workers. The law overturned 
the presidential gag order, granted 
postal workers the right to form  
a union, and codified tenure protec-
tions for many federal workers. 
Another important civil liberties 
development was the 1920 Civil 
Rights Law provision signed by 
New York Governor Alfred E. Smith 
protecting the right of public work-
ers to petition government officials. 
Extending that individual right into  
a collective right to file departmental 
grievances with union represen-
tation became a priority for many 
organizations, but such procedures 
did not get codified until the 1950s 
and 1960s. Even today, most work-
place-related speech and petitions by 
individual public employees remain 
unprotected by the First Amendment.
Early Examples of 
Militant Public Unionism 
in New York City
Lobbying and political action were never the sole means adopted by municipal work-
ers. From the beginning there was a 
more militant strain. Early examples 
include periodic strikes by sani-
tation workers over wages, hours, 
and workloads, including an April 
144 UNION CITY: 1898–1975
1911 strike that was defeated with 
strikebreakers.
In the 1930s militancy grew 
among other groups of city work-
ers. Bricklayers and other building 
trades workers struck over wages 
on projects funded by the feder-
al Works Progress Administration 
(WPA). Many of the more militant 
public-sector unions were Commu-
nist led. A union of city relief workers, 
the Association of Workers in Public 
Relief Agencies (AWPRA), demand-
ed the right to bargain collective-
ly, led demonstrations and sit-ins, 
challenged civil service exams as 
having an adverse impact on African 
Americans, and protested anti-union 
retaliation. Informal negotiations be-
tween the AWPRA and agency offi-
cials resulted in a 1935 departmental 
disciplinary procedure that included 
union representation, a review of the 
discipline by a neutral board, and a 
ban on discrimination based on race, 
creed, or union activity.
Social unionism, which links 
workplace issues with broader social 
justice causes, grew as well during 
the Depression Era. The AWPRA 
opposed race discrimination and 
police brutality and aligned itself 
with others in advocating for the 
unemployed. The New York City 
Teachers Union worked with com-
munity groups to improve public 
schools by supporting increases in 
funding, the hiring of African-Amer-
ican and Puerto Rican teachers,  
the introduction of African-Amer-
ican history and culture into the 
curriculum, and a ban on racist and 
anti-Semitic textbooks. 
In 1936 the AWPRA joined 
the American Federation of State, 
County and Municipal Employees 
(AFSCME), an AFL affiliate. The 
AFSCME’s primary mission at its 
founding was to expand and en-
force the civil service system. New 
York AWPRA leaders VVW Flax-
er and William Gaulden became 
AFSCME vice presidents, making 
Gaulden one of the highest-rank-
ing African Americans nationally in 
union leadership. 
Following the creation of the 
Committee for Industrial Organi-
zation (CIO), the AWPRA and its 
members formed the nucleus of a 
competing CIO public-sector union, 
the State, County and Municipal 
Abram Flaxer, a leader 
of public relief workers, 
became an important 
figure in the city’s emerg-
ing CIO union politics 
during the 1930s.
Abram Flaxer, 1937
Photograph by Harris 
and Ewing
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Workers of America (SCMWA). Afri-
can Americans and women, including 
Ewart Guinier, Mary Luciel McGorkey,  
and Eleanor Goding, were among 
the SCMWA’s leaders. It took decades  
before other public-sector organi-
zations had integrated leadership. 
The SCMWA’s founding princi-
ples focused on bargaining, legis-
lation, education, and antidiscrim-
ination. Strikes and picketing were 
prohibited. The union’s moderate 
tactics were remarkably different 
from the CIO-led industrial sit-down 
strikes. The initial rejection of strikes 
stemmed from the CIO’s alliance 
with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
who opposed militancy by govern-
ment workers, but recognized the  
legitimacy of public employee 
self-organization. The SCMWA’s po-
sition on strikes fluctuated through-
out the 1940s. The union was 
successful in negotiating collective 
bargaining agreements in the late 
1930s and 1940s with public em-
ployers in other states including New 
Jersey, Michigan, and West Virginia. 
City Worker Unionization in 
the 1940s and 1950s
For the next decade the SC-MWA, the AFSCME, the Civil Service Forum, and other 
organizations competed to represent 
city workers, department by de-
partment. This competitive form of 
plural representation required each 
organization to have a presence in 
the workplace, and regular personal 
contact with department workers. 
The SCMWA’s strongest base of 
support was among welfare and 
hospital workers. 
In 1941 New York City Depart-
ment of Sanitation workers quit the 
Civil Service Forum and joined the 
AFSCME. The move took place in 
the face of an organizing campaign 
by the CIO’s Sanitation Workers 
Organizing Committee led by the 
SCMWA’s Flaxer. Mayor Fiorello La 
Guardia and Sanitation Commission-
er William F. Carey thwarted the CIO 
campaign to organize the 10,000 
workers by granting the AFSCME 
exclusive representation rights in the 
department. Collective bargaining 
rights for city workers and political 
favoritism in the Sanitation Depart-
ment were issues raised in William 
O’Dwyer’s unsuccessful campaign in 
1941 to deny La Guardia a third term. 
The SCMWA also organized state 
workers in the city, creating locals  
in state departments in competition 
with the Civil Service Employees 
Association (CSEA). The SCMWA 
successfully lobbied Governor 
Herbert H. Lehman in 1939 to issue 
a memorandum directing state 
agency grievance procedures with 
a right to representation. But a bill 
supported by the SCMWA to require 
each city department to create a 
similar grievance procedure and to 
grant city workers the right to a join 
a union died in the City Council. 
Collective bargaining in New York’s 
public sector was slow in coming. 
The delay can be attributed to three 
factors: lack of support from civil 
service organizations, legal imped-
iments, and opposition from politi-
cians, including Mayor La Guardia, 
who objected to negotiating lim-
itations on his authority. Indeed, La 
Guardia opposed SCMWA-supported 
collective bargaining legislation. He 
also refused to negotiate with the 
CIO’s Transport Workers Union of 
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America (TWU) after two bankrupt 
private subway lines were unified 
with a municipal line to create an 
extensive public system, although he 
did agree to a grievance procedure 
with union representation.
The tide began to turn in the 
O’Dwyer administration. After suc-
ceeding La Guardia in 1946, William 
O’Dwyer aligned himself with the 
TWU and its president, Michael J. 
Quill, to support negotiations for 
transit workers. O’Dwyer rewarded 
the SCMWA by ending the AFSC-
ME’s exclusive representational role 
in the sanitation department. Later 
that year, the CIO merged the SCM-
WA with another of its public-sector 
unions to form the United Public 
Workers of America (UPWA). 
But tensions remained high. 
Public workers in New York State 
were part of the nationwide strike 
wave that followed World War II.  
Upstate strikes and threatened 
strikes by the TWU resulted in a 
strong political backlash in Albany.  
A teachers’ strike in Buffalo for high-
er wages precipitated the legislature 
to pass the Condon-Wadlin Act in 
1947 with draconian anti-strike pen-
alties for public workers.
The passage of the Condon- 
Wadlin Act coincided with the begin-
ning of the Cold War, a dark and re-
pressive period in public employment. 
The UPWA tried to remain vigilant, 
leading demonstrations at Welfare 
Department offices concerning staff-
ing levels and relief payment increas-
es, and bargaining contracts at The 
New School (a Manhattan University) 
and trade schools. The UPWA and its 
activists were subject to city and fed-
eral investigations, targeted by city 
officials, and purged from the CIO in 
1950, claiming the organization was 
dominated by Communists. 
Meanwhile, public school teachers 
active in the New York City Teachers  
Union, a UPWA affiliate, were inves-
tigated and fired under the Fein-
berg Law. (This 1949 civil service law 
amendment prohibited the employ-
ment of teachers and others in public 
schools and colleges who advocated 
or taught “the doctrine that the 
government of the United States 
or of any state or of any politi-
cal subdivision thereof should be 
Members of the 
New York City 
Teachers Union 
protest Board  
of Education 
interrogations and 
firings of alleged 
communists, 1950
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The Beginning of Collective 
Bargaining for City Workers
The dawn of public-sector col-lective bargaining in New York came with the 1953 election 
of Mayor Robert F. Wagner Jr., who 
received support from the labor 
movement. Following his inaugura-
tion, Wagner gave a green light for 
the holding of representation elec-
tions and collective bargaining for 
transit workers, leading to the first 
formal public-sector agreements in 
New York. He also issued an interim 
order in 1954 that recognized the 
right of city workers to join a union 
without retaliation and to have rep-
resentation under agency grievance 
procedures. Governor Thomas E. 
Dewey issued a similar executive  
order a few years earlier, at the urg-
ing of the CSEA, for state workers. 
DC 37 put the interim order to 
use and campaigned to organize 
5,000 New York City Department 
of Parks employees. Following a 
well-publicized battle with Parks 
Department Commissioner Robert 
Moses, and City Hall intervention, DC 
37 won the right to represent park 
workers after an election. 
Another turning point came in 
1957, when the city implemented 
nonexclusive dues deduction check-
off for all city unions. Dues checkoff 
was a goal of many unions, because 
it is a more efficient alternative to 
collecting dues directly from mem-
bers in the workplace and after work. 
Dues checkoff had been part of deals 
reached a decade earlier between 
the TWU and transit officials, and 
between the UPWA and the City of 
Yonkers, to avoid threatened strikes.
Finally, after years of study, in 
March 1958, Wagner issued Exec-
utive Order 49 (EO 49), referred to 
as the “Little Wagner Act,” which 
created the largest public-sector 
collective bargaining program in the 
country. Yet EO 49 had its limita-
tions: it created a representation 
overthrown or overturned by force, 
violence or any unlawful means.”)
The attacks on the UPWA and 
its activists by the CIO and gov-
ernment officials led to the union’s 
demise. The UPWA’s destruction did 
not end worker militancy or efforts 
to attain legal protections for self- 
organization and collective bargain-
ing. Instead, it opened space for 
expanded organizing by rival labor 
organizations, some of which hired 
former UPWA activists such as Jack 
Bigel, who, years later, became a key 
labor advisor during negotiations 
that helped the city avoid bankrupt-
cy during the mid-1970s fiscal crisis. 
In the early 1950s, leadership 
and tactical disputes resulted in the 
AFSCME losing more than two-thirds  
of its city membership. The biggest 
loss came in 1951 when the United 
Sanitationmen’s Association (USA), 
under the leadership of John J. 
DeLury, affiliated with the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters. 
The following year, Henry Feinstein 
received a charter to form Team-
sters Local 237 with hundreds of 
former members of AFSCME District 
Council 37 (DC 37), who were au-
to-engine men and a small group of 
hospital workers. Feinstein’s depar-
ture provided the AFSCME’s Jerry 
Wurf with an opportunity to rebuild 
DC 37 using trade union strategies 
and tactics. 
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system dominated by Wagner and 
his appointees, with a cumbersome 
array of citywide and departmental 
units based on occupational classi-
fications; it also lacked a neutral im-
passe procedure. Still, it introduced 
public-sector collective bargaining 
in New York.
The UFA was the first union cer-
tified as the exclusive representative 
for a bargaining unit, which included 
officers of all ranks within the fire de-
partment, except the chief and dep-
uty chiefs. The USA was the second, 
and the first to negotiate a contract 
with the city, covering 10,000 sanita-
tion department workers.
From then on, collective bargain-
ing between unions and the city grew 
rapidly, and so did strikes. A short 
teachers strike for recognition in 1960 
led to a representation election won 
by the United Federation of Teachers 
(UFT) over other teacher unions. In 
1962 the UFT and the Board of Edu-
cation negotiated a first contract for 
a unit of more than 35,000 teach-
ers, but only after another one-day 
strike. During this period, there were 
other short strikes by sanitation 
DC 37’s Lillian Roberts 
was jailed under the 
Taylor Act for leading a 
strike by workers in New 
York State mental hospi-
tals. A judge released her 
after she served 14 days 




from right) after her 
release from jail, 
1968
The 1966 transit strike 




workers, city motor vehicle drivers, 
and others.
Wagner, in 1963, lifted the orig-
inal exclusion of police from cover-
age under EO 49 (although in lifting 
the ban, he disqualified any union 
that admitted employees other than 
police force members or advocated 
in favor of strikes). His extension of 
collective bargaining to the police 
department resulted in five bargain-
ing units based on rank and rep-
resented by separate unions, with 
police officers being represented  
by the PBA.
Civil Rights, Collective 
Bargaining, and Strikes
Even as they fought for bar-gaining rights, a number of municipal unions also pursued 
broader social goals. DC 37, the UFT, 
and other city unions supported the 
growing Civil Rights Movement and 
provided it with financial support. 
Thousands of their members partic-
ipated in the 1963 March on Wash-
ington for Jobs and Freedom.
In 1965, the Welfare Department  
and the Department of Hospitals, two 
former strongholds of the UPWA, 
became the focus of increased 
149Public Workers
TWU President Mike 
Quill tears up a tem-
porary strike-barring 
injunction issued by 
State Supreme Court 
Justice George 
Tilzer, December 31, 
1965
Photograph by Paul 
DeMaria
militancy and organizing. Eight 
thousand Welfare Department 
workers represented by the Social 
Service Employees Union (SSEU) 
and DC 37 participated in a month 
long strike that was settled after the 
city accepted a fact-finding panel’s 
recommendations for substantial 
wage and health-benefit increases, 
workload limitations, and increased 
staffing. Mayor Wagner also agreed 
to appoint a panel to recommend 
changes to the city’s collective bar-
gaining program composed of labor 
representatives led by DC 37’s Victor 
Gotbaum, city officials, and neutral 
public members.
Later that year, DC 37 scored 
a major victory over Teamsters 
Local 237 in an election to represent 
20,000 hospital workers after a de-
cade of interunion rivalry. Two Afri-
can Americans, Local 237’s Bill Lewis 
and DC 37’s Lillian Roberts, played 
leading roles in the bitter campaign. 
Subsequent DC 37 victories in de-
partmental elections resulted in the 
union gaining majority support and 
the right to negotiate on a citywide 
basis for a unit of all clerical workers 
and a unit of employees under the 
Career and Salary Plan, a city classi-
fication system of mostly white-col-
lar titles and occupational groups. 
Additional election victories by DC 
37 made it the largest and most 
powerful municipal union in the city. 
But DC 37 was not the only 
militant union. After decades of 
strike threats, on January 1, 1966, the 
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TWU pulled the trigger with a strike 
of 35,000 members that shut down 
the transit system for 12 days. The 
strike began the same day a new 
mayor, Republican John V. Lindsay, 
was sworn into office, a harbinger of 
labor conflicts to come during his 
TWU Local 100 
members on strike, 
1966
Photograph by Paul 
Slade
first term. Virtually all the municipal 
unions had endorsed Lindsay’s op-
ponent, Democrat Abraham Beame, 
in the 1965 campaign, and they 
remained suspicious of Lindsay’s 
aloofness and his labor agenda.
Union Rights Granted to All 
New York Public Workers and 
Strike Penalties Increased 
The 1966 transit strike led to new calls for replacing the Condon-Wadlin Act, which 
had proven ineffective in deterring 
the strike. Governor Nelson Rocke-
feller appointed a committee of 
experts, headed by George Taylor, a 
professor at the Wharton School of 
Business, to propose legal chang-
es to improve labor relations and 
avoid strikes. The Taylor Commit-
tee’s March 1966 report broke new 
ground by recommending collective 
bargaining rights for all state and  
local government workers, along 
with new penalties and procedures 
for strikes. In the same month, the 
tripartite panel appointed by Wagner 
issued a report with its own recom-
mendations for improving city-labor 
relations. Those recommendations, 
which were opposed by the SSEU 
and other unions, formed the basis 
for the New York City Collective 
Bargaining Law (NYCCBL). 
Opposition to the proposed Tay-
lor Law substantially delayed its pas-
sage in Albany and the enactment of 
the NYCCBL by the city council. Mu-
nicipal unions vehemently opposed 
the Taylor Law’s anti-strike provi-
sions and held a May 1967 rally at 
Madison Square Garden to condemn 
them. Local governments opposed 
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Day three of the 
sanitation workers 
strike, 1968
the expansion of collective bargain-
ing rights to employees of counties, 
cities, towns, and villages beyond 
the five boroughs. On the other 
hand, the CSEA strongly supported 
the law because it would expand 
collective bargaining geographically 
and continue the ban on public- 
sector strikes.
On September 1, 1967, the Taylor 
Law and the NYCCBL became 
effective. Besides extending collec-
tive bargaining rights throughout 
New York State and increasing strike 
penalties, the Taylor Law codified 
dues deduction checkoff, established 
bargaining-impasse procedures, 
permitted card-check certification, 
and banned unions that discriminat-
ed based on race, creed, color, or 
religion. The NYCCBL created a new 
city collective bargaining program 
consistent with the Taylor Law, 
replacing EO 49. A neutral tripar-
tite municipal agency, the Office of 
Collective Bargaining (OCB), was 
formed to determine representation 
issues, consolidate the unwieldy sys-
tem of bargaining units, and admin-
ister procedures to resolve contract 
grievances and bargaining impasses. 
The Taylor Law’s new strike pen-
alties did not deter the UFT, led by Al 
Shanker. The UFT organized a three-
week strike of 45,000 teachers short-
ly after the law became effective. The 
strike concerned wages, class size, 
and the power of classroom teachers 
to remove disruptive students.
In 1968, there were major and 
divisive strikes by sanitation workers 
as well as teachers. The sanitation 
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workers walked off the job after 
rejecting an agreement with the city 
negotiated by their leader, John J. 
DeLury. The strike angered many 
city residents as thousands of tons 
of garbage remained uncollected 
for nine days. 
At the beginning of the 1968–69 
school year, the UFT led a series 
of strikes over community control 
of the schools and tenure rights in 
Ocean Hill–Brownsville, shutting 
down the school system for months. 
The strike created a major wedge 
between the city’s labor movement 
and Civil Rights Movement, and be-
tween elements of the African-Amer-
ican and Jewish communities. The 
Ocean Hill–Brownsville conflict pitted 
the UFT, which had a large Jewish  
membership with tenure and other 
contract rights, against African- 
American leaders and parents who 
insisted that their communities should  
control the hiring, firing, curriculum, 
and administration of schools in their 
neighborhoods.
In the same year, after two 
years of negotiations, DC 37 and 
the city reached a first citywide 
contract for a unit of 120,000 
workers. The agreement enhanced 
the employee pension plan and 
made further changes, concerning 
hours, overtime, and other working 
conditions. In February 1969, the 
city signed contracts with DC 37 for 
more than 40,000 clerical and hos-
pital workers, resulting in substantial 
wage increases and a minimum 
salary of $6,000. 
By the end of Lindsay’s first 
term, New York City’s new system of 
collective bargaining had begun to 
work. There were newly negotiated 
contracts, a decline in strikes and 
contract impasses, the consolidation 
of bargaining units, fewer interun-
ion rivalries, and a greater voice for 
city workers in workplace policies. 
Outside the city, there was a massive 
wave of organizing by numerous 
unions seeking to represent state 
and local government workers with 
bargaining rights under the Taylor 
Law. The organizing led to a prolifer-
ation of new collective bargaining re-
lationships, contracts, impasses, and 
a large increase in strikes, which did 
not dissipate until the late 1970s.
UFT supporters rallying 
during the divisive 1968 
teachers’ strikes.
Supporters of strik-
ing New York City 
teachers, City Hall, 
1968
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City labor negotiations were 
sometimes long and contentious, but 
the fruit of the process was a sub-
stantial improvement in the econom-
ic well-being of municipal workers 
and their families, along with greater 
uniformity in city departmental 
policies. Internal union bureaucracies 
were established to negotiate and 
pursue issues through the grievance 
process. Lindsay took a leading 
role in advocating for legal changes 
to require nonmembers to pay an 
agency fee for union representation 
to help ensure labor peace. Satis-
faction with the improvement in city 
labor relations led DC 37, the USA, 
and the TWU to support Lindsay’s 
reelection in 1969.
This did not mean that all was 
harmonious in Gotham. Firefighters 
and police participated in sick-outs 
and slowdowns in the early 1970s. 
DC 37 and Teamsters Local 237 
led a disastrous two-day June 1971 
job action of 8,000 drawbridge 
and sewer operators to protest the 
failure of the state to approve further 
enhancements to the pension plan 
that had been negotiated with the 
city. The strike resulted in major  
traffic jams as thousands of mo-
torists were unable to cross draw-
bridges and millions of tons of 
untreated sewage was dumped into 
the city’s waterways. 
The 1971 strike was the antithe-
sis of social unionism. Rather than 
trying to build community support, 
the strike had consequences that 
angered the public, politicians, and 
the press, feeding a growing dissat-
isfaction with the city’s trajectory. 
Taxpayers, fueled in part by white 
backlash, were resentful over the sal-
aries and benefits for an increasingly 
African-American and Latino mu-
nicipal workforce. Financial analysts 
questioned the city’s reliance on 
short-term debt to finance budget 
Victor Gotbaum, 
executive director 
of DC 37 at a press 
conference during 
a strike of workers 
responsible for the 
operation of draw-
bridges, 1971
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The Aftermath of the Fiscal 
Crisis and Public-Sector 
Unionization Today
Those dark clouds foreshad-owed the mid-1970s fiscal crisis, which upended, but did 
not destroy, collective bargaining. 
The shock of the fiscal crisis opened 
the door for a new age of austerity 
that included external controls over 
negotiated contracts, layoffs, and 
less militancy among city workers 
and their unions. The concept of 
government as the model employer 
to be emulated by the private sector 
disappeared from labor-advocacy 
and public-policy discussions. 
The relative weakness of city 
unions at the bargaining table, grow-
ing out of the fiscal crisis, led them 
to develop more sophisticated polit-
ical-action programs, primarily as a 
rearguard measure to preserve and 
enhance benefits and protections. 
Unions developed get-out-the-vote 
initiatives, such as phone banking and 
door-to-door canvassing, in support 
of union-endorsed candidates in 
primary and general elections.
Union density today among all 
government workers in the New 
York City metropolitan area is 69 
percent. Constructive relationships 
between the city and its unions 
continue to form the necessary 
bedrock for positive labor relations. 
But the increased prioritization of 
political action and the centraliza-
tion of authority in union bureau-
cracies throughout the decades 
caused membership mobilization 
about workplace issues to atrophy. 
Militancy still exists, but only within 
occupational pockets, including the 
unlikely pair of police and faculty 
unions that have led street demon-
strations and other forms of protest 
in support of their respective bar-
gaining demands.
Public-sector unions face new 
threats, including the 2018 Supreme 
Court decision striking down the 
agency shop as unconstitutional, 
thereby mandating the “right to 
work” in public employment. These 
developments have made pub-
lic-sector collective labor rights 
more vulnerable and has required  
government workers and their 
unions to begin to relearn the import-
ant organizing lessons of the past.
Members of the Uni-
formed Firefighters 
Association Local 
94 during a brief 
(five-and-a-half-
hour) strike, 1973
Photograph by Harry 
Harris
deficits emanating from a shrinking 
tax base caused by deindustrializa-
tion and suburbanization, in addition 
to the growing cost of expanded 
municipal services and collective 
bargaining agreements. 
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